By Sumon Mukhopadhyay — April 09, 2026.
MEP Infrastructure:
The Toll Road That Led to a Dead End
Then came 2020. Then came the lockdowns. And then came the reckoning that has left the company fighting for survival under the National Company Law Tribunal's watch.
MEP's story is one of inspired over-reach. The company understood, early and correctly, that India's toll road business was a royalty stream. You do not sell a product; you clip a coupon every time a vehicle passes. In 2016, MEP carved out a 26% market share in the nascent Hybrid Annuity Model (HAM) space — bidding for 8 projects and winning 5. It raised ₹324 crore via its 2015 IPO, followed by a ₹162 crore QIP in 2018.
Its subsidiary, MEP Infrastructure Private Limited (MIPL), became the crown jewel — recording Profit After Tax of ₹40 crore (FY20), ₹83 crore (FY21), and a remarkable ₹114 crore (FY22) as traffic normalized post the first wave. The parent company's consolidated revenue crossed ₹1,000 crore in FY22. By any measure, this was a functioning, growing infrastructure franchise.
"In 2016, MEP carved 26% of India's HAM market. By 2024, the same ambition that built it had buried it under ₹840 crore of unpaid dues to a single municipal corporation."
| Year | Event | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2018 | Eastern & Western Peripheral Expressways open | Traffic diversion hits SDMC contract |
| Mar 2020 | COVID lockdown; toll plazas go dark | Revenue collapses overnight |
| 2020–21 | Force Majeure claim of ₹597 Cr filed | Partially acknowledged; not paid |
| FY2022 | Revenue recovers to ₹1,002 Cr at consolidated level | Last profitable year for MIPL |
| FY2023 | HAM harmonisation; MIPL reclassified as Asset Held for Sale | Revenue collapses to ₹269 Cr |
| Oct 2022 | Bank of India issues recall notice for ₹128 Cr | Trigger for insolvency |
| Mar 2024 | NCLT Mumbai admits CIRP petition | Company enters insolvency |
| Oct 2025 | NCLT begins hearing on resolution plan | First sign of possible exit |
| Jan 2026 | 21st CoC meeting held | Process still active, no plan approved |
The numbers reveal a structural problem, not just a COVID casualty. Even before the pandemic, MEP had accumulated ₹840 crore in unpaid dues to the South Delhi Municipal Corporation by March 2020 — a default that pre-dated any lockdown. The peripheral expressways had already begun bleeding the Delhi toll contract since 2018. COVID simply removed the last mask.
MEP is not worthless. It is distressed — a meaningfully different condition. The company retains operational assets, institutional knowledge, and a track record that cannot be replicated in a boardroom: 135 completed projects, 222 toll plazas built and operated, presence across 15 states, and two decades of government relationships in the OMT sector.
India's infrastructure story has not dimmed. The government is expanding national highways aggressively, HAM projects continue to be awarded, and the OMT sector needs experienced operators. A well-capitalised resolution applicant — a road-focused NBFC, a PE fund, or a larger infrastructure conglomerate — could acquire MEP's operational spine at a fraction of replacement cost.
The NCLT has already commenced hearing a resolution plan as of October 2025. That alone signals that at least one serious bidder exists. The 21 CoC meetings held since March 2024 indicate active creditor engagement, not a deadlocked process heading to liquidation by default.
"The assets are real. The roads are real. The institutional memory of running Mumbai's toll network is irreplaceable. The question is only whether anyone will pay a fair price for it — or whether creditors will blink first."
Stacked against the bull case is a mountain of red flags. Revenue has declined at an annualised rate of 51.4% over five years. The company has posted losses for eight consecutive quarters. Interest expenses of ₹400 crore now exceed half-yearly revenues of ₹320 crore — a structural impossibility to sustain. Cash equivalents have dwindled to a critically thin ₹132 crore.
The promoter situation is corrosive. Jayant Mhaiskar's family holds 26% of the company, but 78.13% of promoter shares are pledged. IDBI Bank — one of the lenders — is now selling its ₹100 crore exposure at a 25% haircut through Swiss Challenge auction, implying recovery expectations of roughly 75 paise on the rupee. When lenders start auctioning debt at discounts, it signals they have stopped believing in a full resolution.
The CIRP has dragged beyond the statutory 270-day window without an approved plan. The Delhi Municipal Corporation has filed claims in the insolvency, adding another creditor complication. And the new IBC Amendment Act 2026, while allowing CIRP restoration, also explicitly enables dissolution by the CoC — a sword that now hangs over any prolonged resolution process.
This is the only question that matters for any stakeholder in MEP today. The honest answer is: it could go either way, and the next 90 days are likely decisive.
The resolution plan hearing commenced in October 2025 is still pending final approval. Under normal CIRP timelines — already well exceeded — the NCLT would either approve a plan or direct liquidation. The newly enacted IBC Amendment Act 2026 adds pressure: it allows a 120-day restored CIRP window if the first plan is rejected, but also permits outright dissolution on 66% CoC approval. With 21 meetings behind them and no approved plan yet, creditor patience is visibly fraying.
The most likely outcome, based on available data: a significantly haircut resolution — creditors recovering 40–60 paise on the rupee — to a strategic buyer who values the operational assets. Liquidation remains a tail risk, not a base case, simply because the physical infrastructure and government contracts still have intrinsic value. But for equity shareholders, the recovery in either scenario is likely to be negligible.
Bull Case
- 22 years of toll operations, 135 completed projects — real institutional IP
- Resolution plan being heard at NCLT — a buyer exists
- India's highway expansion continues; OMT operators are needed
- Acquisition at distressed prices could unlock significant value
Bear Case
- Revenue –51.4% annualised over 5 years; losses for 8 straight quarters
- Interest costs exceed revenues — mathematically unsustainable
- IDBI selling debt at haircut; 78% promoter shares pledged
- No approved plan after 21 CoC meetings — patience is finite
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